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Abstract Modern IP-based wide-area surveillance systems often build on networks of
multi-modal, intelligent and mobile sensor units. Detection of complex events is per-
formed on intelligent sensors and fusing input in the sensor units or centralized control
room components. The domain of surveillance and public safety creates requirement
for robustness and fault-tolerance. This article will present an automated intelligence
architecture for mobile surveillance, which provides capabilities for combining on-
board event detection in sensor units, centralized decision making on the server side,
and automated exploitation of mobile surveillance unit positioning data. This architec-
ture must be very reliable to provide services in the face of challenges such as natural
disasters and fire, potentially damaging the infrastructure of the surveillance system.
To increase its reliability and robustness, we study the introduction of a self-healing
system into the architecture and examine the combined system’s operation in three
case studies.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, surveillance systems for public safety have evolved into distributed and
intelligent sensor networks [1]. The key building blocks of many current generation
surveillance systems consist of (1) a network of sensors, potentially multi-modal and
mobile, (2) an IP-based transport network which often allows wireless connectivity,
and (3) centralized components providing functionalities such as decision making and
monitoring. The increasing amount of sensors introduces more need and possibili-
ties for distributed intelligence, while the use of wireless sensor networks facilitates
the introduction of mobile and intelligent surveillance units on the field. One of the
challenges within current generation surveillance systems is to establish an efficient
distributed architecture design facilitating information acquisition via analysis [1]. As
more systems employ wireless surveillance units, the need for providing real-time
location-specific information should also be addressed [1].
The surveillance domain carries high demand for reliability and robustness [2],
to maintain real-time performance in incidents [3]. In current IP-based surveillance
systems, handling network failures is critical for achieving the required level of relia-
bility [4]. The use of wireless and mobile devices further increases the need to tackle
unexpected failures automatically, e.g., using self-configuration principles [1].
In this article, our aim is to specify a robust self-healing software architecture
applicable to different mobile surveillance scenarios. This architecture should take
advantage of distributed intelligence and positioning data of multiple mobile sur-
veillance systems, to realize automated event analysis. Furthermore, the architecture
should facilitate automated self-healing methods to survive failures, increasing the
reliability and robustness of the system.
To best exploit the possibilities brought in by modern surveillance technology in the
context of mobile wide-area surveillance, the architecture should realize the following
key features:
• Use of intelligent sensors on the mobile surveillance units to perform distributed
event detection
• Use of centralized intelligence to detect complex events from multiple input sources
and automatically co-ordinate actions of the mobile units
• Exploitation of positioning information of the mobile units and detected events in
the decision-making process for increased efficiency.
The rest of the article is arranged as follows. In Sect. 2, we study prior surveillance
system designs related to sensor unit co-operation and sensor unit mobility. In Sect. 3,
we propose a software architecture for intelligent mobile surveillance, and introduce
an autonomic self-healing solution to this architecture in Sect. 4. We describe three
case studies to investigate the use of self-healing in the surveillance system context in
Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we present our conclusions with topics for future work.
2 Related works
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland has previously presented the Single Loca-
tion Surveillance Point (SLSP) system for IP-based intelligent surveillance, supporting
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multi-modal sensor fusion and automated reasoning. The SLSP system was designed
to be deployed in a single location such as a large room or hallway. In the SLSP use
case, statically positioned sensors are directly connected to a centralized decision-
making server. Sensor mobility, positioning data and distributed decision making on
the sensor side are not addressed in the SLSP design [5].
Correlation and co-operation of multiple sensor units are presented in multiple pub-
lished surveillance system designs. In Hou et al. [6], data from a network of video
cameras are correlated on a centralized server to, e.g., track objects and detect unautho-
rized moving events. A distributed approach to sensor unit co-operation is presented in
Hou et al. [7], where video camera units collaborate autonomously to send commands
and alerts to nearby units and personal mobile devices. The aforementioned designs
and scenarios deal with statically deployed surveillance units, and do not consider
sensor unit mobility. Several published surveillance designs mention exploitation of
positioning information of mobile units [8–16]. Applications of positioning infor-
mation include visualization of units on the field [12], autonomous navigation and
coordinating groups of units [8,9,13,14] as well as surveillance coverage optimiza-
tion [10]. While not directly concerning sensor unit mobility, multiple surveillance
designs make use of location data for detection of events and/or objects [6,15–18].
The designs in [11,16] combine object detection and tracking with coordination of
multiple mobile agents by utilizing groups of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) [11]
and ground-based robots [16].
3 The SPY–VTT architecture for mobile intelligent surveillance
We present a software architecture for a distributed, IP-based surveillance of a physical
area, enabling the use of both distributed and centrally coordinated intelligence, as well
as the exploitation of surveillance unit mobility. The architecture, depicted in Fig. 1,
consists of an arbitrary number of mobile units equipped with intelligent sensors, as
well as a centralized control room, which reacts to alerts and manages the mobile
units. The architecture is a part of a larger software framework called the Surveillance
improved sYstem (SPY). The subsystem described in this article will be referred to
as SPY–VTT.
The mobile units communicate with the control room side using wireless IP-based
networks. Control room components may be connected either wirelessly, or using
Ethernet, either on a local or a distributed network. Decision-making and alerting
communication between the components is performed using data messages exchanged
over transmission control protocol over internet protocol (TCP/IP). The components
of the architecture are further detailed in the following subsection.
3.1 SPY–VTT architecture components
The mobile sensor unit (MSU) represents software on-board of a mobile unit deployed
in the area under surveillance. The software is connected to one or more intelligent
sensors, which provide high-level event data or metadata, such as “suspicious object
detected in video”, instead of, or in addition to raw sensor data. Potential sensor types
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Fig. 1 SPY–VTT architecture for mobile intelligent surveillance
include, e.g., intelligent video cameras and audio sensors. Types and amount of sensors
depend on the configuration of the MSU and the surveillance scenario in which the
system is deployed. A global positioning satellite (GPS) sensor is required on each
MSU for periodically reporting the unit’s position to the control room.
The MSUs contain decision-making capabilities for processing event input from
sensors. In the currently envisioned scenarios, internal MSU decision making is
intended primarily for two purposes: (1) Filtering out redundant or benign events
reported by sensors for saving wireless network bandwidth and control room process-
ing time, and (2) Fusing together multiple atomic inputs from different sensors into
single complex events. The MSU receives messages and commands from the con-
trol room components, as incidents reported by MSUs are automatically reacted on.
Commands may consist of, e.g., pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) or recording commands to sen-
sors, while messages may contain, e.g., instructions to move towards an area where
additional MSUs are needed. The architecture also allows MSUs to share data and
communicate with each other through the control room. MSUs can represent multi-
ple different types of surveillance units, and multi-type MSUs can cooperate within
the same scenario. Possible MSU types include, e.g., manned units such as police
cars, deployable unmanned wireless camera units, or personal devices equipped by
patrolling surveillance personnel.
The Gateway manages the TCP/IP message connections between SPY–VTT com-
ponents. MSUs send data to the control room components or each other through the
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Gateway, which also routes responses and other messages to the appropriate MSUs.
Messages are directed to their appropriate receivers by the Gateway using control
room components with unique identification strings of the components. MSUs do not
have to possess information of the physical addresses of different control room com-
ponents when using the Gateway. Conversely, the control room components do not
have to maintain connections to each of the MSUs currently online in the system.
The mobile surveillance positioning server (MSPS) processes, stores and distributes
positioning data of the MSUs deployed on the field. As MSUs report their position
periodically to the control room software, the MSPS stores the information into a
database. The server provides a querying interface for retrieving the current and past
MSU positioning data by LDMS and other possible components from the MSPS
database. The LDMS may query, e.g., for the positioning information of a specific
MSU, or multiple MSUs to track positions of MSUs currently within a certain distance
of an event.
The logical decision-making server (LDMS) provides decision-making capabilities
for automatically utilizing data from the MSU network. It is based on the non-mobile
LDMS design within the SLSP system [5]. The LDMS receives event data from the
MSUs on the field in real-time as messages containing high-level event data. Analysis
may consist of the following types of deductions: (1) determining the seriousness of
a reported event thereby deciding on whether there is need for further actions, and
(2) correlating similar reports from multiple MSUs into a greater complex event, and
deciding on a response based on this correlation. Based on event analysis, LDMS
automatically performs actions depending on the scenario and the perceived threat
level of the event reported. The actions may consist of, e.g., issuing commands to
controllable sensors, sending alert messages to be displayed for surveillance personnel,
or providing directions to a unit for relocating to the area of the perceived threat.
LDMS also utilizes MSU positioning information it queries from MSPS. In currently
envisioned scenarios, the positioning data can be exploited by LDMS automatically
in two ways: (1) In case of an event requiring assistance from additional MSUs,
LDMS can automatically select the most suitable MSUs, e.g., those closest or most
quickly movable, to assist the original reporter of the event. (2) If multiple similar
events are reported within a close proximity, the LDMS may deduct that a larger
area of disturbance can be found, and can instruct other MSUs to cover the area in
question.
3.2 Advantages of the SPY–VTT architecture
The use of LDMS together with data originating from the MSUs enables the SPY–VTT
architecture to take advantage of location-specific information of actors working on the
field in a wide-area surveillance scenario. The system can take in consideration the cur-
rent position of units and sensors on the field, instead of relying on a network of static
sensors as depicted in [6,7]. A number of prior designs primarily focus on supporting
a specific type of mobile or deployable surveillance unit such as ground-based robots
[8,10,13,16], UAVs [9,11] or video camera units [15,17]. The SPY–VTT architecture
does not limit the types of MSUs used, and also allows coordinating combinations of
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different MSU types as required by the surveillance scenario and environment. The
scale of the geographical area to cover is also not limited by SPY–VTT, although in
real-life implementation factors such as unit communication range [11] need to be
addressed. In centralized decision making within the SPY–VTT architecture, MSU
positioning data can be combined with location-specific event and object detection
data from the MSUs in a similar fashion to [6,11,16–18]. This makes the SPY–VTT
system aware of the situation of all entities involved in surveillance, namely (1) units,
(2) sensors and (3) events or objects. The gathered situational information can be used
by LDMS for various types of automated reacting via a centralized decision-making
process, while previous designs have concentrated on, e.g., visualization [12] and
navigation assistance [8,9,13,14].
The centralized decision-making approach makes it possible for the architecture
to collect all the data produced by distributed entities utilized in surveillance as well
as the events these multiple units have identified. This facilitates a broader situa-
tional awareness, which in turn enables processing and recognizing complex scenar-
ios with access to all necessary information from the field. As a whole, the SPY–
VTT architecture efficiently exploits the potential resources available in a distributed
and mobile surveillance environment, by realizing the combination of key features
in mobile surveillance: (1) distributed intelligence in surveillance units, (2) central-
ized decision making for handling complex events that require situational aware-
ness from multiple sources together with coordination of multiple actors on the field,
as well as (3) exploiting the positioning information of various surveillance entities
on the field. This combination of distributed, centralized and mobility-aware opera-
tions enables the architecture to support various mobile surveillance scenarios, from
locating unwanted events to coordinating response efforts among multiple geograph-
ically distributed sensors and personnel. Thus, the SPY–VTT architecture provides a
comprehensive and adaptable solution for modern intelligent surveillance in mobile
environments.
4 Introduction of a self-healing solution into the architecture
In this section, the need for a self-healing solution to integrate with the SPY–VTT
architecture is analyzed. That results in a strong requirement which is fulfilled by the
combination of the SPY–VTT architecture with an existing solution from the domain
of autonomic computing/networking.
A traditional approach to resilience in systems engineering is to carefully dimension
the system parameters, and add additional backup components, such that hardware
and software problems do not immediately make the system deteriorate. A modern
approach is to enable the self-healing of a system by introducing software-based
solutions that can increase the robustness with respect to a wide range of software
and even hardware problems. Next, we investigate how this approach can improve
our proposed surveillance architecture. At the end of this section, the advantages of
the proposed approach when it comes to ensuring the robustness of SPY–VTT are
highlighted.
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4.1 Self-X functions and autonomic control loops
During the past decade there was a significant push within the community towards
the investigation and adoption of self-X features within the system architectures, e.g.,
self-configuration and self-healing. This included the notion of autonomic computing
as introduced in a number of fundamental papers elucidating and defining key aspects
and concepts [19–21]. In addition, concepts from the autonomic computing field are
applied and investigated in various scopes within the IT and telecommunications world,
such as for example in the scope of cloud computing and efficient virtual resources
management [22,23].
The core idea towards the adoption of self-X behaviors is constituted by the intro-
duction of agents inside the devices, which should have the capabilities to monitor
and manage a set of resources with respect to different potential problems. The basic
architecture for such an autonomic entity is illustrated in Fig. 2. This architecture
identifies the steps within a generic control loop required for self-management as
monitoring, analyze, plan, and execute, and it is widely known as the MAPE model.
In that scope, a generic autonomic manager/element is responsible for a set of managed
resources (element) and acquires information regarding their operation using different
monitoring functions/probes, which are denoted as Sensors in Fig. 2. The monitoring
aspect is illustrated by the Monitor step of the autonomic manager/element. Further,
the monitored information is passed to the Analyze step that is responsible for cor-
relating the different observations and understanding the situation of the managed
resources/element. Given that the analyze step of the control loop has detected a prob-
lem in the operation of the managed resources, corresponding action(s) need(s) to be
planned, which is the task of the Plan step in Fig. 2. Finally, the Execute step is in
charge of executing the planned action(s) on the Managed Resources over a set of
Effector interfaces. All the above described control loop phases may be differently
























Fig. 2 The IBM-MAPE control loop [19] for autonomic computing
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of the managed resources/element. These various models would contain vital infor-
mation for the correct operation of the single steps and would in that way constitute a
Knowledge base as depicted in the middle of Fig. 2. At the end, the autonomic man-
ager/element itself might constitute a managed resource/element for an upper layer
autonomic manager/element and, therefore, offers its own sensors and effectors inter-
faces. Based on this or similar [24,25] control loop structures, different self-X features
are implementable.
4.2 The UAFAReS architecture for self-healing and its role within the SPY–VTT
system
The unified architecture for autonomic fault-management, resilience and survivabil-
ity (UAFAReS) [26] was developed in the course of different international projects.
UAFAReS aims at specifying components and interfaces for the implementation of
self-healing features within the involved devices. Related research in the area of self-
healing network infrastructures is given by [27]. Trehan [27] investigates various math-
ematical tools for the fast reconfiguration and reestablishment of connectivity in self-
healing networks. In addition, Sarma and Trehan [28] focus on different design princi-
ples for network infrastructures, which can be proven to enable the efficient restoration
of end-to-end connectivity in the face of node and/or link failures. The work presented
in [29] aims at introducing a terminology and a reference model for self-healing on top
of diverse radio access technologies (RAT). Finally, Yuan et al. [30] investigates the
implementation of self-healing mechanisms in wireless sensor networks. In compari-
son to these ideas, UAFAReS aims at realizing the processes of autonomic self-healing
in a way that they can be easily configured to tackle different problems in the network
devices and in the network as a whole. The basic idea is based on the insight that tradi-
tional fault-management processes as known from the telecommunication domain can
be automated towards the realization of fault-removal and correspondingly self-healing
in a distributed system. Traditionally, the telecommunication management network
(TMN) standard [31] and related understanding views fault-management as consist-
ing of fault-detection—“detect the presence of a fault”, fault-isolation—“find the root
cause(s) for the observed erroneous state”, and fault-removal—“remove the identi-
fied root cause(s)”. In that context UAFAReS aims at realizing self-healing aspects
by enabling the automation of these processes, and identifying additional processes
which emerge in the course of that automation. Moreover, components are introduced
that enable the immediate reaction to a faulty condition with the aim to sustain some
basic system functionality. That way UAFAReS enables the realization of survivabil-
ity aspects as known in telecommunication protocols such as SONET/SDH [32]. In
addition, UAFAReS aims at providing hooks and APIs for implementing proactive
resilient behaviors that aim at avoiding failures if such a trend is detected.
The UAFAReS components to be deployed inside a node within the SPY–VTT
surveillance system are presented in Fig. 3. By a node we mean either an MSU on
the field, the Gateway, the MSPS, the LDMS or other supporting machines, e.g.,
database servers. In addition, the overall process that is collaboratively executed by
the UAFAReS components across multiple nodes is depicted in Fig. 4. Basically, within
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Fig. 3 The SPY–VTT–UAFAReS architecture based on [26]
Fig. 4 The self-healing process according to [26]
a node, UAFAReS consists of two autonomic agents, decision elements (DEs) [25],
which are responsible for realizing the self-healing function in tandem. In that context,
the UAFAReS instances in the SPY–VTT nodes are responsible for collaboratively
handling incidents related to the overall set of resources and functional entities in each
SPY–VTT node. This overall set of resources and functional entities on node level is
summarized as managed entities (MEs) inside a SPY Node on Fig. 3. To effectively
handle incidents w.r.t these MEs, one DE is responsible for an immediate fault-masking
reaction to a detected incident—this is the resilience and survivability DE (RS_DE),
while the other fault-management DE (FM_DE) is in charge of identifying the root
causes of the observed faulty conditions and removing these root causes in the long-
term operation of the system (see Figs. 3, 4). That is, the overall self-healing process, as
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illustrated in Fig. 4, consists of two parallel tasks: (1) one responsible for an immediate
fault-masking reaction, and (2) another task responsible for isolating the root causes
for the experienced faulty conditions and removing them in the long term.
Fault-detection within the SPY–VTT–UAFAReS architecture is performed either
by a dedicated monitoring system (such as the one presented in [33]) or by mon-
itoring tools that can instantiate the APIs of the UAFAReS framework. These
APIs provide the possibility of pushing incident information into the UAFAReS
faults/errors/failures/alarms repositories inside a node. The incident information is fur-
ther disseminated to other nodes over the incident dissemination engine, and forwarded
to both local decision elements—RS_DE and FM_DE. That way incident information
across the distributed system is made available to all FM_DEs and RS_DEs operating
inside the nodes.
The resilience and survivability DE (RS_DE) includes a fault-masking functions
(FMF) block and a risk assessment function (RAM). FMF offer hooks for implement-
ing immediate reactions to reported incidents, while RAM uses monitoring informa-
tion and raises alarms, in case a failure is anticipated. In that case, the FMF should
get active and mitigate the potential faulty condition. Thereby, the FMF implement an
event-condition-action type of policies, which are executed by a policy engine. When
responding to alarms and incidents the FMF processes may refer to the multi-layer
resilience properties repository, to obtain information related to the intrinsic resilience
properties of the underlying entities. For example, there might be a situation which
can be resolved quickly by a protocol or application without the need for an imme-
diate intervention. However, if the entity does not succeed after a period of time,
then the FMF should react. Such related information, e.g., timeouts, is stored in the
aforementioned multi-layer resilience properties repository.
The fault-management DE (FM_DE) [34] is responsible for implementing the
automation of fault-detection, fault-isolation, and finally fault-removal in the long-
term operation of the SPY–VTT system. Incidents that get reported to the FM_DE are
correlated by the so-called fault-diagnosis/localization/isolation (FDLI) functions, to
identify a root cause. Thereby, the FDLI functions use a causality/fault-propagation
model that is stored in the belonging repository. For traversing such a fault-propagation,
we use a Markov Chain based algorithm that we specified and analyzed in our previous
work [35]. Thereby, we systematically infer the probability for particular root causes
to be the explanation of the experienced symptoms by combining insights from the
areas of probability theory, linear algebra and data structures’ design. Once a set of
root causes has been identified, it is passed to the fault-removal functions (FRF) that
tend to remove them and improve the operational conditions of the SPY–VTT system.
These FRF once again implement an event-condition-action type of policies. Thereby,
they employ scripts or tools which were preconfigured on the device and are executed
as a result of the policies evaluation determining how to react to the identified root
causes. These scripts might consume information regarding the dependencies among
functional entities stored in a dependability model repository. To avoid conflicting
actions executed in parallel by the FM_DE and the RS_DE, the action synchroniza-
tion functions (ASF) are put in place. This component should be referred by both
DEs to synchronize and eventually allow or disallow their tentative actions. In the
course of that, the ASF use a utility function-based approach [35–37] to synchronize
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the tentative actions and their potential impacts on the system. Within this approach,
an optimization problem is solved for the set of tentative actions to select the best
actions that do not contradict and improve the overall health of the system. Finally,
in case of an executed action, the fault-removal assessment functions (FRAF) check
whether the root causes have been indeed removed, and if not escalate the situation to
the SPY human operator. The FRAF operate once again based on an engine realizing
if-then-action type of policies.
The UAFAReS architecture has been developed and implemented over the course
of three years and applied to different case studies from the domain of telecommu-
nications. Further information on the algorithms implemented in the above described
components, as well as on the case studies, can be found in [35–39].
4.3 Advantages of the UAFAReS framework for ensuring the robustness
of the SPY–VTT architecture
UAFAReS was selected as the appropriate self-healing framework due to various
advantages over other available systems. First of all, UAFAReS is based on a generic
model for autonomic networking named GANA (generic autonomic networking archi-
tecture) [25,40], which is currently being standardized at ETSI [41,42]. That means
that UAFAReS would be easy to integrate with other autonomic entities based on
the GANA reference model. In addition, UAFAReS comes with a stable implementa-
tion, which was worked out in the scope of the EU EFIPSANS project [43]. Finally,
UAFAReS offers generic configuration interfaces that can be used to configure it as
to address various types of problems within the SPY–VTT architecture. This provides
a serious advantage compared to similar (but limited in their scope) frameworks such
as UniFAFF1 [44], Omega [45], and D2R2+DR2 [46]. Thereby, Omega is limited to
3G networks. UniFAFF focuses on clean-slate networks, such as the Autonomic Net-
work Architecture [47], and D2R2+DR provides a generic conceptual framework for
Resilience, which is instantiated on case study basis.
5 Case studies
This section presents three case studies, based on discussions with officials and other
actors in surveillance for public safety, with the goal to illustrate the interplay between
the SPY–VTT mobile surveillance architecture and the UAFAReS architecture for
autonomic self-healing. Thereby, the case studies show how the robustness of the
surveillance system is increased, which in turn allows for better managing complex
emergency situations and can support lifesaving operations. At the end, a summary of
the case study and a discussion of the limitations of our approach are provided.
1 Unified Framework for Implementing Autonomic Fault-Management and Failure-Detection for Self-
Managing Networks.
2 Defend, Detect, Remediate, Recover, plus Diagnose and Refine.
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5.1 Overcoming gateway unavailability through autonomic self-healing
The surveillance scenario for our first case study is illustrated in Fig. 5. In addition to
control room components, the scenario consists of five patrolling MSUs, labeled MSU
A-E. MSUs A–C represent road vehicles, while MSUs D and E are UAVs equipped
with cameras to provide an aerial view on the situation. In the scenario, MSU A detects
an alarming event and reports it to the control room, which determines that additional
MSU support is needed. Based on MSU positioning data, nearby patrolling units are
instructed to assist. In this case, the road vehicle MSU C as well as UAVs D and E are
requested to move to the place of the event. We presume that all MSUs are equipped
with the software components of the SPY–VTT–UAFAReS architecture.
Operation of the SPY–VTT components involved in the scenario is detailed within
the following sequence diagrams. The sequence diagram in Fig. 6 depicts MSU reg-
istration and continuous operations running at pre-defined intervals while the system
is operational.
• Upon initialization, each MSU sends a registration message to the LDMS for log-
ging into the SPY–VTT system (1).
• Once active, the MSU continuously updates its GPS positioning data to the MSPS
with pre-defined intervals (2).
• LDMS continuously sends keep-alive messages to each active MSU to ensure their
availability (3).
The steps specific to the case study scenario, performed after MSU registration, are
depicted in Fig. 7.
Fig. 5 First case study illustration
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Fig. 6 Case study sequence diagram for continuous operations
• MSU A sends a message to the LDMS, reporting a sensor event determined to be
a potential incident, in this case a fire (1).
• LDMS decides to instruct other MSUs to provide assistance. To choose the optimal
assisting MSUs, LDMS uses the MSPS to retrieve the positions of MSUs within
distance X to the coordinates MSU A, previously reported (2).
• LDMS sends out instructions to relocate to the event location to MSU C, which is
determined to be in the vicinity of the reported event (3).
• LDMS informs MSU A of backup which has been sent to the area of the reported
event (4).
Assuming a situation in which the burning facility is also the one hosting a base
station, the MSUs will experience a loss of network connectivity to the Gateway and
correspondingly to the LDMS and MSPS components. This would severely hamper
the functioning of the SPY network and might even cause the loss of human life,
since the rescue force would miss valuable information. The SPY–VTT–UAFAReS
components must react in an attempt to restore the flow of messages and enable the
transmission of events to relevant decision makers.
The reaction of the SPY–VTT–UAFAReS components consists of the following
steps:
• Once the SPY–VTT software on the MSUs detects the lack of network con-
nectivity to the Gateway, it reports this incident to the local repositories for
faults/errors/failures/alarms.
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Fig. 7 Case study main sequence diagram
• The incident description is forwarded to the local fault-management decision ele-
ment (FM_DE) and to the local Resilience & Survivability Decision Element
(RS_DE).
• In addition, the incident description is submitted to the local Incident Dissemination
Engine (IDE) of UAFAReS with the goal to convey it to the largest possible number
of MSU nodes.
• The IDE broadcasts the incident description over the radio link and disseminates in
that way to the other involved MSUs. Hence, after some time all the involved MSUs
(A, C, D, and E) will have informed each other about their lack of connectivity to
the Gateway.
• Based on this set of incident descriptions, the fault-isolation (FDLI) functions inside
the FM_DE of each MSU conclude that there is a severe failure of the corresponding
base station.
• To overcome this failure, the RS_DEs of each MSU are triggered to issue a proper
reaction based on their embedded Fault-Masking Functions (FMF).
• The FMF of all road vehicles are preconfigured as to influence the network stack
on the belonging MSU to stop sending information to the mobile network (LTE or
UMTS), but instead to just broadcast it to other MSUs over the radio link.
• The FMF on all UAVs are preconfigured as to switch to a store-carry-forward (SCF)
mode as discussed in [48,49]. In such a mode, the UAVs would receive and store
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Fig. 8 Second case study illustration
a number of packets sent out by the road vehicles, carry those packets to the next
functioning base station, and off-load them to the network towards the Gateway.
Steered by the SPY–VTT–UAFAReS components in each MSU, data flow is main-
tained from the MSUs to the Gateway and correspondingly to the LDMS and MSPS.
Certainly, it is impossible to transmit continuous data in such a situation. However, in
that context, the SCF method would facilitate the reporting of non-continuous data,
such as new events and images, to the control room, thereby allowing relevant decision
makers to better take action.
5.2 Adaptive surveillance for coping with network congestion
The second case study is illustrated in Fig. 8. In this case study, two types of MSUs are
utilized to monitor a public event with large crowds: deployable static camera units
with PTZ controls and image analysis capabilities (MSU A–C), as well as personal
mobile devices on security personnel patrolling the area of interest (MSU D–F). MSU
initialization and position reporting are identical to the first case study and Fig. 7. Fur-
thermore, we presume that all involved nodes are equipped with the components of the
SPY–VTT–UAFAReS framework. This includes the MSUs as well as the components
of the control room illustrated in Fig. 8.
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In this scenario, a disturbance is detected within the large crowds present in the
area by image analysis performed on MSU B, and reported to the control room. The
immediate reaction of the LDMS would be to alert the nearest security personnel
patrolling the area, in this case MSU D and MSU E, to attempt and control the crowd
in the area of the incident. However, given the large crowd and correspondingly the
large number of mobile devices in that area, it is possible that the belonging LDMS
messages fail to reach the MSU D and MSU E because of the resulting network
congestion. This congestion could be caused by, e.g., overloaded UMTS/LTE base
stations. The network congestion would especially get visible at the Gateway, where
the LDMS messages are routed to the relevant MSUs. Hence, the communication
stack on the Gateway will experience the failure to deliver the LDMS messages to
MSU D and MSU E. In such a situation, the following steps will be executed by the
components of the SPY–VTT–UAFAReS framework, to remediate the challenge:
• Once the communication stack on the Gateway detects the lack of reachability to
MSU E and MSU D, it reports that to the UAFAReS repositories on the Gateway.
• Subsequently, the incident description is forwarded to the FM_DE and RS_DE as
well as to the IDE, all of them within the Gateway.
• The IDE disseminates the incident information to all reachable components of the
SPY–VTT architecture such that corresponding error messages can be shown on
the monitors of the surveillance personnel.
• Still, the LDMS requires additional information regarding the crowd disturbance,
to automatically improve its analysis of the events and aid the responsible persons
in handling the complex situation.
• Therefore, the RS_DE on the Gateway would activate its FMF, which would imple-
ment a behavior so as to trigger the camera MSU that initially reported the distur-
bance, i.e., MSU C in Fig. 8, to switch its zooming capabilities and to continue
reporting detailed zoomed images to the LDMS. That way, the quality and detail
of the information provided to the LDMS would be increased, despite the network
congestion problems in the involved communication stacks and links.
This second case study demonstrates how the combination of the SPY–VTT archi-
tecture with a framework for autonomic self-healing has the potential to facilitate the
provisioning of the best possible data to the LDMS, despite challenges due to net-
work congestion. This is especially crucial in emergency situations where the overall
system would strive to supply the LDMS with high-quality information, to facilitate
better data analysis in the LDMS and aid the corresponding decision makers, thereby
supporting lifesaving operations.
5.3 Self-healing within the IT infrastructure of the control room system
The third case study is related to the IT infrastructure running in the control room
system and the use of database technology in that context, as illustrated in Fig. 9.
Referring back to the operating sequences depicted in Figs. 6 and 7, one can observe
that there are regular interactions and queries directed to the MSPS, to handle the
positions of different MSUs. All these communications to and from the MSPS imply
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Fig. 9 SPY–VTT control room architecture with database subsystem
regular updates and queries issued on the database running in the background. We pre-
sume an implementation in which the MSPS uses a Hibernate [50] persistence layer
to communicate with a PostgreSQL [51] database (see Fig. 9). Our experiences with
such a setting have shown that a version mismatch3 between the Hibernate database
driver and the PostgreSQL database can lead to a problem in the closing of database
connections. This problem might in turn sporadically lead to failures while opening
new database connections, and correspondingly to problems querying and updating
MSU positions within the MSPS. Assuming that the MSPS developers and opera-
tors are not aware of the version mismatch, they would only observe that database
connections are sometimes not released resulting in issues while handling GPS data.
To remediate this problem, the MSPS operators would use the SPY–VTT–UAFAReS
autonomic self-healing capabilities and features. That is, a lightweight monitoring
daemon would be instrumented on the MSPS node, to observe the number of open
database connections. This daemon would interplay with the SPY–VTT–UAFAReS
components of the MSPS node in the following way:
3 It might be a difficult task to identify the version mismatch as responsible for the problem of database
connection closing, since in general the entire set of database features function, and the failure to close
database connections appears non-deterministically. We needed a couple of months and a large number of
tests to diagnose such a problem in a prototype of ours.
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• The database connections monitoring daemon would periodically check the number
of open connections
• In case a pre-defined number of open connections are being approached, the dae-
mon would create an alarm description, which would be pushed to the SPY–VTT–
UAFAReS repositories on the MSPS node.
• The MSPS-node-IDE would in turn disseminate the alarm description to the
involved machines and would correspondingly notify the SPY–VTT–UAFAReS
components on the machine hosting the database.
• Subsequently, the alarm description would be forwarded to the FMF of the RS_DE
on the machine hosting the database. These FMF are preconfigured as to react by
automatically restarting the PostgreSQL database and that way releasing the large
number of open connections.
• A restart is also required for the database communicating module of the MSPS,
to release the connections which were opened on the MSPS node. Therefore, the
FMF of the belonging RS_DE would automatically restart the MSPS server and
trigger the release of all database connections.
By executing these steps, the MSPS services would be only shortly unavailable and
would then continue handling GPS data from the MSUs. Hence, by introducing auto-
nomic self-healing features into the SPY–VTT architecture, it is possible to remediate
emergent erroneous situations in the IT infrastructure of the control room system,
e.g., due to the unawareness of the MSPS operator for a version mismatch between a
Hibernate driver and a PostgreSQL database.
6 Summary and discussion of the case studies
The case studies presented here are based on experiences with the SPY–VTT archi-
tecture and on much experimentation with the reaction mechanisms of the UAFAReS
framework. Thereby, the case study related to the database management (PostgreSQL)
is based on experiences from managing positions of mobile nodes in a project from
the Smart Cities context, while the field case studies are based on theoretical consid-
erations and discussions with actors from the public safety domain.
The detailed specification of the UAFAReS reactions within the scope of the case
studies allows for discussing on the advantages brought by the proposed combination,
and by its limitations in increasing the resilience of a SPY–VTT deployment. The
clear advantage brought by the combination of SPY–VTT and UAFAReS is that the
operation of the surveillance system can continue in the face of particular problems
which have been captured in the models (Fault-Removal policies, Fault-Mitigation
policies, Causality Model, etc.), based on which UAFAReS operates in the SPY–
VTT nodes. However, the point that particular situations must have been directly or
indirectly anticipated, and thus captured in the operational models, constitutes also a
major limitation of the UAFAReS framework and its resilience support for SPY–VTT.
In case of problems which were not identified as potential challenges, the UAFAReS
components will not be able to react correctly and the SPY–VTT framework will fail
to deliver its services for the relevant decision makers. In addition, UAFAReS is only
able to overcome problems as long as there is a theoretical possibility for (partially)
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restoring the service through the removal of a fault (root cause) or through the usage
of alternative resources, e.g., in the case of deploying the UAVs to store-carry-forward
content to the closest functioning base stations. In situations where this is not possible,
UAFAReS would not be able to implement a resilient behavior, which in turn would
mean that SPY–VTT would not be able to continue its operation.
To summarize, the case studies clearly show how the combination of the presented
technologies can have significant impact on public safety. In addition, it must be clear
that the proposed combination would improve the resilience, but not resolve all poten-
tial threats to the presented mobile surveillance system. However, the clear positive
impact on public safety in general, invites to continue the research and development
activities relating to the proposed combination of a mobile surveillance system and an
autonomic framework for self-healing.
7 Conclusions and future work
In this article, we have presented our research related to the realization of a robust
architecture for distributed mobile surveillance, event detection and automated react-
ing based on location-specific situational awareness of the mobile surveillance envi-
ronment. We define components that realize distributed monitoring of an area, and
extract events which are reported to a set of centralized components and reacted upon
based on automated decision making capable of complex event processing. However,
in a case of a catastrophic event, the surveillance system itself could be impaired by
the effects of the event in question. To remediate this issue, we combine our proposed
surveillance network with a self-healing framework that emerged in years of research
around the topic of autonomic computing/networking. This solution also operates in a
distributed manner inside the nodes of the surveillance system and matches the nature
and requirements of our distributed surveillance architecture.
Our case studies demonstrate the benefits of a distributed and intelligent mobile
wide-area surveillance system, as well as the benefits of combining such architecture
with a distributed framework for autonomic resilience and self-healing. With respect
to the pure SPY–VTT architecture, we see how the mobile nodes can support each
other based on distributed event detection and the intelligence of the control room
components. However, the case studies show that the surveillance system itself can
be vulnerable to effects around the alarming event it is meant to provide information
about. In such cases, it is imperative for the SPY–VTT architecture to deploy self-X
mechanisms to self-organize in the face of the posed challenge. The case studies illus-
trate how the distributed reaction mechanisms can lead to a change in the behavior
strategy of the MSUs for delivery of information to the control room. The function-
alities presented in the scenario may thus be vital and lead to saving human lives
in catastrophic situations. Based on our case study examples, we conclude that the
combined SPY–VTT–UAFAReS architecture can provide a robust and fault-tolerant
solution for distributed and intelligent mobile surveillance. With flexible usage of dif-
ferent entities’ positioning information, a combination of distributed and centralized
decision making, as well as abilities for overcoming technical failures, the architecture
is suitable for versatile critical surveillance scenarios in mobile environments.
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In future research regarding the SPY–VTT architecture, we will further evaluate the
design based on our findings regarding the importance of self-healing in increasing
reliability in critical surveillance scenarios. We intend to focus on various aspects such
as scalability and robustness based on long-term simulations and experiments.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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